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Abstract
Ethical considerations for autonomous vehicles (AVs) go
beyond the “trolley problem” to include such aspects as risk /
benefit trade-offs, informed consent, risk responsibility and
risk mitigation within a system of systems. In this paper we
present a methodology for arguing that the behaviour of a
given AV meets desired ethical characteristics. We identify
some of the ethical imperatives surrounding the introduction
of AVs and consider how decisions made during development
can impact the ethics of the AV’ s behaviour.
1 Introduction
Autonomous systems (a category which includes AVs) have
been proposed for use in multiple domains, with examples
including nuclear containment, defence systems, health and
transport. The ethical requirements across each of these
domains will inevitably differ, and in many cases there is no
consensus as to which system behaviours would be deemed
ethically appropriate.
Ethics is not restricted only to safety, and the discussion of
ethical introduction and behaviour of AVs may include
considerations of environmental impact, economics,
manufacturing processes and adequate financial investment
[1]. However, in this paper we will focus on the safety and
ethical aspects of the proposed use of AVs for transport.
We present a method for arguing that the behaviour of an AV
meets specified ethical characteristics, and that these align
with safety. Section 2 provides some ethical background,
while Section 3 introduces the safety and ethical landscape
around AV introduction. In Section 4 we introduce the
concept of risk trade-offs, and in Section 5 discuss safety,
ethics and the development of systems. Section 6 presents a
methodology for constructing ethical arguments, aligned with
safety case arguments and drawing on risk profiles, and
Section 7 contains conclusions.
2 Ethical background
The “trolley problem” refers to a well-known ethical thought
experiment, in which a train / trolley is on a set of tracks
which will cause it to collide with a number of people. The
observer is asked whether s/he would choose to switch the
train to a second set of tracks which will cause it to collide
with a single person only. Amendments and extensions to the
trolley problem have couched the problem in terms of an
active vs passive choice as well as experimented with the
relative “worth” of each person affected.
The trolley problem has a clear analogue in the case of AV
behaviour, in that a situation may be encountered in which a
collision with at least one group of people is inevitable. In this
case, the developers responsible for the behaviour of the AV
must address a trolley problem: which group(s) should the
AV choose to impact. This is explored further in [2].
2.1 Systems of ethics
The trolley problem can be used to illustrate a number of
different ethical systems, providing examples of how these
might differ in their application to AV behaviour.
Consequentialism [3] is often considered to provide a
reasonable foundation for discussion of AV ethics and
behaviour. Consequentialism is an ethical theory which
prioritises the outcomes: consequentialist ethics deems acts to
be morally acceptable if they lead to a good outcome. This is
sometimes summarised as “the end justifies the means”. A
consequentialist approach to AV safety would be to seek to
reduce overall harm by minimising the number of people
harmed; a consequentialist solution to the trolley problem
would be to switch the trolley onto the section of the track
with a single person. Consequentialism as an ethical theory is
aligned with more general safety criteria [4] in terms of
minimising harm, but does not take into account questions of
risk responsibility, informed consent for acceptance of risk
and calculations relating to acceptable exposure due to work.
By contrast, deontological theories of ethics prioritise acting
in accordance with explicitly stated duties and rules [5].
Deontology therefore does not require the AV to consider the
outcomes, but merely to act in accordance with pre-
programmed rules (which may include, for example, a rule
that the AV must not injure – or cause to be injured – any
person). While encoding such rules is conceptually simpler
than requiring the AV to perform calculations minimising
harm, deontological ethics does require the identification of
rules for every situation the AV may find itself in. A
deontological approach to the trolley problem would be to
consider whether rules exist which govern the acceptability of
switching the trolley to a different track, regardless of the risk
exposure to any individuals.
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virtue ethics, typically presented in terms of self-sacrifice [6].
This discusses the extent to which an AV should choose to
sacrifice itself and its passenger when placed in a situation in
which this would reduce harm to a third party.
2.2 Additional ethical dilemmas
More generally, from a safety perspective we are concerned
about the risk posed by the AV to different groups, and the
ethical justification for prioritising the safety of one group
over another. This extends the trolley problem to other
situations in which the risk is the deciding factor. In the
following examples where we refer to the decisions or
choices made by the AV, this is to be understood to be the
decisions and choices made by the AV system developers
which result in the defined behaviour.
In [6] a case is presented whereby an AV may choose to
position itself within a lane closer to a smaller car than to a
truck. This decision might be justified in two ways: firstly,
that this behaviour is typical of a human driver, and secondly
that this reduces the risk to the AV (a collision with a small
car may reduce harm to the occupants of the AV). From a
safety perspective, this decision has prioritised the safety of
the AV occupants – and the truck occupants – over that of the
smaller car. Such a decision would need to be justified within
the safety case and from an ethical perspective.
Another situation arises whereby an AV may take the
opposite course; choosing to drive closer to (or in the worst
case, impact) a heavier vehicle, or a vehicle with safety
systems which are known to be better [6]. In this case the
severity of an accident may be reduced, compared to an
impact with a vehicle with poor safety systems. However,
implementing such a decision into the behaviour of the AV
represents a deliberate choice to increase the risk to drivers of
certain vehicles known for their safety features. Again, this
decision would need to be justified both ethically and in the
safety case.
Other situations discussed in the existing literatures include
the decision of an AV to sacrifice itself (place itself in the
path of another vehicle to save a third party from impact) [6],
as well as choosing to impact a motorcyclist wearing a helmet
over one not wearing such protective devices [7].
3 Safety and ethical landscape
As we discussed in Section 1, the ethical landscape
surrounding the introduction of AVs is not limited only to the
trolley problem and to AV behaviour during collisions. While
we do not go into detail on the ethical issues which are not
directly relevant to safety (e.g. environmental impact, job
loss, capability benefits, inequality of access to technology
etc.), there are a number of issues which do impact indirectly
on the safety considerations for AVs.
The first of these is the question of commercial forces driving
early adoption of AVs. There is significant public interest in
AVs, particularly around self-driving cars, and engineering
companies are alert to the advantage of bringing out the “first
of kind” of an AV. However, unlike the military and nuclear
domains, the high-profile nature of commercial AVs can
encourage the categorisation of safety as a competitive
advantage. This means that best practice can be difficult to
establish, and known problems may not be shared for reasons
of commercial interest.
In addition, there are currently no applicable standards which
fully address the safety of AVs, including safety of the
intended function [8]. Consequently, while there is a clear
economic and reputational imperative for a company to bring
out the “first of kind” in autonomous vehicles, it is much less
clear that such an AV could be demonstrated to be acceptably
safe. There is a risk that the push to produce and market AVs
can encourage “quick and dirty” practices during the
development lifecycle which can have an effect on the system
as released to the public. While standards do exist around
ethical design of systems [9], these are relatively new and
their general applicability has not been fully determined.
Another question which arises is that of risk transfer and
system safety, as previously introduced in discussions of the
trolley problem. We expand on this in Section 4, but in brief,
a simplistic argument that AVs reduce the overall harm does
not go far enough. It may be the case that a segment of the
population bears an unfair degree of the risk and therefore,
although the overall risk is lower, this segment faces either an
absolute or a relative increase in the proportion which they
bear. The question of consent is also relevant here, in that
other road users may be unwittingly bearing a portion of risk
to which they have not consented. This concern also applies
to the passenger of an AV; if passengers are unaware of the
principles governing AV behaviour, they are not able to
consent to the consequent risks.
When we move from human drivers to automated ones, we
move the intelligence in the decision from conditions of
extreme time stress to a much calmer, slower-paced
environment. This may raise the standard of ethical
performance the public expects. In the case of a human driver,
any decisions made in a collision situation are judged
according to that environment (e.g. there is little time to
choose between different options, the drivers are under stress,
and – except where their actions have been negligent – are
generally not considered culpable should they make the
“wrong” decision [6]). However, an engineer developing the
AV is not under the same pressure, and may therefore be
expected to ensure that the AV reacts in a morally acceptable
way, regardless of how a human driver might.
More generally, equating the actions of an AV with the
actions of a human driver may appear defensible from a risk
acceptance perspective, but it is not clear that the general
public will necessarily be willing to accept the same risk
when it is posed by a machine as opposed to a person.
A more general concern is that of the impact of AVs on the
wider road network. This network can be viewed as a system
of systems (SoS), with the AVs comprising one component
only. The risk posed by an AV may therefore affect any
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emergent behaviour. One example of this may be an increase
in traffic jams due to all AVs following the same route, as it is
in the interest of no individual AV to change route. Another
example may be the effect on driver norms where, for
example, human drivers may customarily let other vehicles
exit from a side street and the road planning is such that it
presumes this type of essentially human interaction. These
situations will be exacerbated in the case of AVs which make
use of machine learning algorithms, where local optimisations
made by these algorithms can negatively affect traffic flow,
safety or efficiency of the wider network.
4 Risk Trades and Risk Profiles
The ethical dilemmas introduced thus far focus on the
situations where the AV behaviour prioritises the safety of
one group over another. That is, in these situations a choice
has been made to reduce one risk posed by the system (e.g.
the risk posed to pedestrians) at the potential cost of
increasing another risk (e.g. that posed to other vehicles).
In general, there may be multiple ways to reduce the overall
risk posed by the system to As Low As Reasonably
Practicable (ALARP). Individual risks can be traded-off, or
balanced against each other as described above, where an
increase in one risk is accepted in return for a decrease in
another. Many safety guidance documents [4] provide little
information on how to make these choices, requiring only that
the overall system risk should be ALARP. It should be noted,
however, that where the concept is discussed in standards [10]
[11], these emphasise the need to balance individual risks
within a system and consider established good practice.
Risk trade-offs and balances can happen at three levels
throughout system development. At the micro level a
developer might make development choices which reduce
certain risks at the cost of potentially increasing others. For
example, a choice of C over SPARK ADA may provide
increased access to experienced developers, but at the cost of
static analysability. At the macro level, as already discussed,
one risk posed by the system may be mitigated at the cost of
potentially increasing another. Section 3.1 presents this in
more detail. Finally, in some situations accepting an increase
in risk in one domain or system may lead to a benefit in
another. This is discussed further in Section 4.5.
4.1 Risk Profiles
In [12] we presented a number of different risk reduction
approaches, or risk profiles, which provide alternative ways
of balancing individual risks in order to achieve an ALARP
system risk. An ontology of these is briefly given below, and
it should be noted that these risk profiles can be combined in
a number of ways to produce a “custom” profile.
4.2 Fairness in improvement
The aim of this approach is to achieve a similar absolute risk
reduction for all individual risks. A fairness in improvement
approach prioritises the reduction of all risks A, B… N
regardless of the relative cost of these reductions (provided
these are reasonably practicable), and regardless of whether
making these reductions to one risk A means that for
technical reasons further reductions cannot then be made to
another risk B. Using a fairness in improvement approach can
mean that no individual risk is as low as technically possible
considered in isolation. However, this approach ensures that
the risk reduction effort confers a certain minimum benefit on
all system risks.
A fairness in improvement approach for AV risk reduction
may correspond to attempting to mimic the actions and risk
reduction behaviour exhibited by a human driver. The risks
posed by an AV will therefore bear a similar relationship to
each other (e.g. some higher, some lower) as the risks posed
by a human driver. It should be noted that an AV developer is
still required to minimise the system risk ALARP, so it may
be the case that the AV presents a lower overall system risk
than the human driver.
4.3 Fairness in outcome
The aim of this approach is to achieve a similar level of risk
for all individual risks. Fairness in outcome means that our
risk reduction attempts prioritise the reduction of a more
severe risk A over the reduction of a less severe risk B. This
is the case regardless of the relative cost of reducing risks A
and B compared to each other, and regardless of whether
making these reductions to A means that for technical reasons
further reductions cannot be made to B. Using a fairness in
outcome approach can mean that the risk reduction efforts are
concentrated on only a few risks, with no benefit for the other
risks. However, this approach ensures that the areas of
greatest risk are targeted by reduction efforts.
A fairness in outcome approach for AV risk reduction may
correspond to a focus on reducing the greatest risks posed by
the AV (e.g. reducing the risks posed to motorcyclists without
helmets, given the correspondingly greater severity of any
collision). In this case a solution to some manifestations of
trolley problem is presented by the choice of this risk profile:
impact with other vehicles is likely, for example, to be a
preferred hazard over impact with pedestrians. However, it
should of course be noted that this does not negate the
requirement for AV system developers to balance these
individual risks such that an increase in one risk is only
permitted given an equivalent or greater decrease in another.
4.4 Long-term risk benefit
The question of system risks that change over time can also
be relevant when balancing individual risks. Standards such
as [10] also consider the possibility of accepting a higher
short-term risk if this results in a long-term risk reduction.
For AV risk reduction, taking a long-term risk benefit
approach prioritises the introduction of AVs, along with any
concomitant short-term increase in risk, should it be possible
to demonstrate that this would lead to fewer lives being lost
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justification within the safety case, as it may not be possible
to demonstrate that in the short term the system risk is
ALARP. Consequently, long-term risk benefit should be used
only to customise and refine other risk profiles.
4.5 External risk transfer
Risk transfer refers to the situation where there are multiple
components or interacting subsystems, such as in the presence
of a SoS. In this case, an ALARP claim for each subsystem
considered in isolation does not necessarily lead to the lowest
overall system risk. In these situations an increase in a local
risk associated with one system may be accepted in return for
a decrease in the risk associated with the wider system. This
is presented in further detail in [12].
More generally, in some cases an increase in a safety risk may
result in a benefit in an external domain. For example, the
presence of certain security features such as Intrusion
Detection Systems (IDS) provides a security advantage while
making it harder to demonstrate the safety of the system
(amongst other concerns, IDS need to be regularly updated,
which is difficult given the rigorous testing and validation
required by safety-critical systems [13]). It should be noted,
however, that this external risk transfer cannot be deemed
acceptable from an ALARP perspective, as the ALARP
principle does not consider benefits outside the safety
domain.
4.6 Risk profiles and ethical behaviour
A risk profile represents a means of balancing risks against
each other, and can be used to describe a set of ethical drivers
or priorities. This can be seen most easily by applications of
the trolley problem: a risk profile prescribes a balance of risks
which prioritises some over others. This corresponds to
prioritising the safety of those groups who are impacted by
the risks deemed by the risk profile to be higher priority. We
can therefore use risk profiles to describe ethically desired
AV behaviour by framing it in terms of risk reduction.
5 Safety, ethics and development
Risk profiles allow us to bring safety and ethics together for
AV behaviour by explicitly presenting the risk balancing and
trade-offs inherent in any implemented solution to the trolley
problem. The safety case must then justify these trade-offs
and balances.
Although ethical questions are not limited to safety (see
Section 3), those that do concern safety deal with the most
severe harms. A safety case which does not consider the
underlying ethics of decisions around risk and harm can be
considered deficient. In order for all stakeholders to
adequately understand the implications of the decisions made
around risk management, the ethical foundation for these
needs to be made explicit within a supplementary “ethics
case”. In this section we propose the use of such ethics cases
and demonstrate how they can be used in conjunction with a
safety case to adequately support arguments around the
behaviour of AVs.
5.1 Engineering and implemented ethics
When referring to the development and operation of AVs
there are two interrelated but distinct applications of ethics
and ethical systems. The first of these we will term
engineering ethics and the second implemented ethics.
Engineering ethics refers to the ethical principles adhered to
by engineers during system and software development. These
may be in the form of principles or codes of conduct
formalised by a professional organisation [14]. They typically
include criteria such as honesty, integrity, respect for law and
the public interest, accuracy, rigour, fairness, objectivity and
leadership. In addition, they encourage further thought and
assessment to determine if any given engineering action is
ethically defensible. It is important to note that adherence to a
code of engineering ethics does not, in itself, mean that the
behaviour of any resultant system will necessarily be
considered ethical by all stakeholders (this can be seen
particularly in the defence domain). However, adherence to a
code of engineering ethics helps to support arguments about
the behaviour and properties of the system by providing
confidence in the integrity of any lifecycle artefacts. Should
developers not adhere to any professional code of ethics, any
argument about the safety of the system or its behaviour can
only be weakly supported.
Implemented ethics, by contrast, refer to the ethics which
govern the behaviour of the AV itself in the field. These can
include the extent to which the safety of the driver is balanced
against that of third parties, and more generally the choices
the AV makes when confronted with various forms of the
trolley problem. Other aspects of behaviour governed by
implemented ethics include the extent to which the AV shares
data, the dynamic measures performed during driving to
reduce environmental impact and the extent to which social
aspects of courteous driving are implemented. Unlike
engineering ethics, there may not be consensus on the “right”
implemented ethics which will govern the behaviour of the
AV. Acceptable ethical behaviour will vary across different
societies (including different countries) as well as different
domains of use. Section 2 discusses this in more detail.
6 Ethics case and argumentation
Just as a claim relating to the safety of the system is supported
by a compelling argument, we propose that a claim relating to
the ethics of the AV should be supported likewise.
As with safety arguments, there is no single “one-size-fits-all”
method of creating an argument to support claims relating to
the ethics of an AV. However, any adequate argument would
need to present a number of foundational principles that
demonstrate the ethics of the AV is adequate, and argue that
these have been shown to be met. In this section, we present a
methodology for doing this which is in line with the
5principles discussed in [9] as well as relevant safety and legal
criteria [4].
The argument we present consists of three independent and
interacting legs, each supporting a different claim. The overall
claim is:
G0: The behaviour of the AV is ethically appropriate for its
proposed context of use.
This claim is supported by three sub-claims:
A0: Engineering ethics are adequately defined, implemented
and adhered to during the development lifecycle.
B0: Implemented ethics are adequately specified and comply
with the legal, social and ethical norms of the environment of
use.
C0: The risk management and design decisions are such that
the AV behaviour adheres sufficiently closely to these
implemented ethics.
We address each of these claims in further detail in the
following sections.
6.1 Claim A0
A0: Engineering ethics are adequately defined, implemented
and adhered to during the development lifecycle.
The purpose of this claim is to demonstrate that the
engineering codes of practice and prescribed ethical
principles are not compromised or impacted by any decisions
relating to the ethical behaviour which it is decided the AV
should demonstrate.
The desired engineering ethics may be identified by
referencing codes of conduct ([14], [15]), domain good
practice and relevant previous decisions and their adequacy
should be justified. Evidence to support this claim may be in
the form of Continuing Professional Development records,
audit records, lifecycle artefacts, documented processes and
policies and so forth.
6.2 Claim B0
B0: Implemented ethics are adequately specified, and comply
with the legal, social and ethical norms of the environment of
use.
We recommend that this claim is broken down into sub-
claims for clarity of argument. A template example is given
below.
B1: The implemented ethics are adequately specified.
This specification may be in the form of references out to
legal documents, to standards and policies, to previous system
design decisions, records of public consultations and so forth.
The specification of implemented ethics must be sufficient to
address all issues raised in Section 5.1, as well as to provide a
justification that the issues under discussion are sufficient and
complete.
B2: The implemented ethics comply with the legal, social and
ethical norms of the environment of use.
As stated in [9], the norms of the relevant community (or
environment of use) must be considered when assessing the
behaviour of the AV. The implemented ethics must be
compatible with these norms. It should be noted that this does
not mean that an AV should behave in exactly the same way
as a human driver (that is, the implemented ethics do not have
to be identical to the ethics currently embedded within the
environment of use), but the two must be compatible, and any
discrepancies identified and a justification provided.
6.3 Claim C0
C0: The risk management and design decisions are such that
the AV behaviour adheres sufficiently closely to these
implemented ethics.
We recommend that this claim is broken down into a number
of sub-claims for clarity of argument. A template example is
given below.
C1: System design and intended AV behaviour are adequately
specified.
This sub-claim should be supported with evidence relating to
the system design and implementation. Its intent is to
demonstrate that the AV system design is specified
sufficiently well enough to reduce the likelihood of
unexpected behaviours. Should the intended behaviour or the
design of the AV be underspecified, then it becomes much
harder to predict whether the resultant operational actions of
the AV will be considered ethically acceptable.
C2: Design decisions and risk reduction decisions reflect the
specified implemented ethics
This claim should firstly be supported by nomination and
definition of a specified risk profile (customised if required,
as described in Section 4). It must also be demonstrated that
this risk profile reflects the desired implemented ethics. The
nomination of a risk profile, with the consequent requirement
that this describe a mechanism for reducing the system risk
ALARP, is necessary in order to ensure that the specified
implemented ethics do not contradict any of the legal
requirements around safety [4].
For example, should the implemented ethics require that the
AV behaviour mimic the behaviour of a human driver
(thereby resulting in no change in relative risk distribution
across the road network from the introduction of AVs), then
we would expect to see a “fairness in improvement” risk
profile selected. In practice, the desired implemented ethics
are likely to be sufficiently complex such that a significant
amount of customisation is needed to any of the “base” risk
profiles.
Secondly, this claim should be supported with evidence that
the risk management and risk reduction decisions reflect the
selected risk profile. In practice, this may best be done by
referring out to individual claims in the safety argument and
demonstrating how the risk prioritisation decisions have been
reflected in the mitigations.
6C3: Any gaps between the behaviour resulting from the
design and risk reduction decisions and the implemented
ethics are adequately justified.
The final sub-claim addresses the fact that, like safety, ethics
is a limit concept [16]. Just as a system cannot be guaranteed
to be absolutely safe, it cannot be guaranteed to be absolutely
ethical (this is exacerbated by the difficulty in adequately
specifying a comprehensive set of ethical principles).
This sub-claim should therefore be supported by a gap
analysis of how well the AV system design and the risk
reduction decisions reflect the implemented ethics. In
practice, restricting this gap analysis to risk reduction
decisions will not be sufficient, and the overall AV design
and behaviour should be considered also. This is because not
all implemented ethics refer to safety (some may refer to
aspects of environmental sustainability, others to elements of
courteous driving etc.). The risk profiles, dealing only with
safety, will not be able to be used to argue that the “non-
safety” requirements of the implemented ethics are met.
Where the behaviour or design is underspecified, this should
be considered as a gap.
For any identified gaps, the argument must demonstrate that
mitigations have been put in place to reduce the effect of
these gaps so far as is reasonably practicable. This parallels
the ALARP requirement for safety, and similar argument
techniques may be used.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we have identified the ethical landscape and
imperatives that govern discussion of AV behaviour. We have
introduced and formalised the concept of risk trade-offs,
which are typically dealt with superficially by applicable
safety-critical guidance. We have considered the ethical
drivers behind these risk trade-offs, and identified the need
for transparency in risk balances and risk trade-offs.
We have presented a methodology for arguing that the
behaviour of an AV meets ethical criteria deemed relevant to
safety. This methodology draws on aspects of safety
argumentation to support a number of claims relating to the
definition of ethically acceptable behaviour, the applicability
of this in the proposed environment and the design decisions
made during AV development. We draw on the concept of
risk profiles to transform ethical principles into the language
of safety and to provide a foundation for discussing how our
ethical principles impact our risk mitigation decisions.
We distinguish between the principles of ethical conduct
constraining the professional actions of engineers, and the
principles of ethics constraining the behaviour of the systems
these engineers design. We recognise that ethics of system
behaviour, like safety, is a limit concept and extend the
consideration of ALARP into the ethical domain. This allows
us to examine whether the behaviour demonstrated by the AV
is sufficiently close to the ethically desired behaviour in the
environment of use.
There is the potential for significant further work in this area,
particularly in the areas of balancing risk trade-offs. It would
be of value to further extend the ontology of risk profiles to
consider which refinements are of most use across multiple
domains. In addition to this, the consideration of ethical
drivers outside safety is also a relevant topic. Security and
privacy are topical concerns for AVs, while human trust and
social integration are issues of note for autonomous systems
in general. There is scope for considering the extent to which
safety, security, ethics and trust interact, and how the
requirements of these can be balanced for a general
autonomous system.
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